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court reasoned that the TCE continued to migrate onto Hoery's
property, and the failure to prevent the pollution plume also
constituted a continuing property invasion.
So long as these
continuing property invasions remained, the court stated that it was
immaterial whether the United States continued to release TCE. The
court thus affirmatively certified that migration and ongoing presence
of toxic chemicals, regardless of whether the pollution has ceased,
constitutes a continuing trespass or nuisance under Colorado law.
Karen L. Golan

CONNECTICUT
Agnello v. Urbano, No. CV000273689S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3421 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2002) (holding that abutters cannot
divert surface water onto the adjacent landowner's property; that
abutters cannot interfere with an express, implied, or prescriptive
easement; and that interference with an easement reasonably
necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of property is trespass).
Joseph and Sharon Agnello filed a six-count complaint against
Armando and Maria Urbano, the adjacent property owner, in the
Superior Court of Connecticut at New Haven.
The complaint
addressed three main issues: (1) whether Urbano diverted surface
water onto Agnello's property; (2) which owner possessed title to a
triangular area of land; and (3) Agnello's easement rights. Urbano
filed a counterclaim, which sought to quiet title and alleged Agnello
trespassed on his property. The court found in favor of Agnello on all
counts.
Agnello and Urbano owned adjacent properties. A twenty-five foot
right-of-way provided access to Agnello's property. In 1999, Urbano
removed a split rail fence located on the adjacent property and
constructed a new fence. In addition, Urbano placed materials in the
right-of-way, which deprived Agnello of access and constructed a
cinder block wall in order to divert surface water onto Agnello's land.
Agnello requested and received a temporary restraining order before
trial. The order prevented Urbano from diverting the water onto
Agnello's land and from interfering with the right-of-way access.
Urbano violated the order by building various barriers and limiting the
right-of-way.
First, the court addressed whether Urbano wrongfully diverted
surface water. The court applied the test formulated in Tide Water Oil
Sales Corp. v. Shimelman, which states, "the landowner, in dealing with
surface water, is entitled to take only such steps as are reasonable."
Accordingly, the court held Urbano improved his land and caused the
water to impermissibly flow on to Agnello's land. The court further
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found Urbano used the surface water unreasonably, because the water
could have been diverted without adversely impacting Agnello.
Second, the court discussed the quiet title claim. The court found
Agnello's expert witness offered more credible evidence than
Urbano's expert witness. Therefore, the court held in favor of Agnello
on the quiet title claim. Additionally, Agnello claimed Urbano
trespassed on her land. The court concluded Urbano had trespassed,
finding Agnello owned the property, Urbano intruded on the land by
intentionally placing materials on the property, and the intrusion
caused direct injury to Agnello. The court refused to award damages
on the trespass claim.
Finally, Agnello claimed easement title based on an easement
conveyed by deed, easement by implication, and easement by
prescription. Agnello produced her property deed, which specifically
mentioned an easement right. The court found Agnello presented
adequate evidence to prove an express easement for "ingress and
egress" purposes. Next, the court stated the factors for easement by
implication-"the intention of the parties and whether the easement is
reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the
Moreover, Agnello established easement by
dominant estate."
prescription by proving adverse possession. Agnello proved the open
visibility of the easement, the uninterrupted use of the easement for
fifteen years, and thus possessed a claim of right.
In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of Agnello and ordered
Urbano to install a drainage system to divert surface water into the
public storm drain system and to cease interference with the easement.
Susan Curtis

ILLINOIS
Nottolini v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 782 N.E.2d 980 (IM.App. Ct. 2003)
(holding that a water-filled quarry is not of natural origin, and
therefore is not a lake).
In 1999, Alecia, Cheryl, and Rick Nottolini ("Nottolinis") filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court of Kane County for a declaration of
their rights to make reasonable use and enjoyment of the surface
The
waters of an abandoned, water-filled quarry ("Quarry").
Nottolinis also requested a permanent injunction to bar the Quarry
owner, William Dwyer ("Dwyer"), from maintaining any fences and
barriers around the Quarry that would restrict their access to it. Dwyer
counterclaimed for a declaration of his exclusive rights to the Quarry.
The court held for the Nottolinis, and denied Dwyer's counterclaim.
Dwyer appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District,
claiming that the circuit court was mistaken in defining the Quarry as a
lake. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case back to the

